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Just four years ago, political pundits were blaming gay rights activists and the Massachusetts Supreme
Court for costing Democrats the 2004 presidential election. In 2003, the Massachusetts court had
declared, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, that denying marriage to same-sex couples
violated that state's constitution, marking the first time a state supreme court recognized the right of
same-sex couples to marry.[1] The decision touched off a widespread backlash; in 2004, eleven states
passed referendums amending their constitutions to outlaw same-sex marriage. In 2006, another seven
states followed suit. Nor was this a short-term phenomenon. During the last decade, forty-one states
have passed statutes banning recognition of same-sex marriages, and twenty-six have amended their
constitutions to that effect.
Yet in the last eight months, the tide appears to have dramatically turned. In October 2008, the
Connecticut Supreme Court declared that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples was
unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, even though Connecticut law already
granted same-sex couples all the legal benefits and rights of marriage under the label of "civil unions."[2]
In April 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court unanimously ruled that Iowa's state ban on same-sex marriage
denied equal protection of the law to gays and lesbians.[3] The same month, the Vermont legislature
enacted a law to make same-sex marriages legal, overriding the governor's veto. Maine enacted a
same-sex marriage law on May 6, 2009. On June 3, New Hampshire followed suit. In New Jersey, the
Supreme Court has required the state to extend to same-sex couples all the benefits and rights enjoyed
by married couples, and the legislature is considering extending marriage itself to such couples.[4] And
the New York State Assembly has passed a bill to make marriage available to same-sex couples. The bill
has the support of Governor David Paterson, though its chances of passage in the Senate remain
uncertain.
A similar pattern is evident in Scandinavia and other parts of Europe. In 1989, Denmark became the first
country in the world to grant official recognition to gay and lesbian couples as domestic partners. In
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2001, the Netherlands became the first country to extend marriage to same-sex couples. Today, same-sex
couples can be married in the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Norway, and Sweden, and can register their
partnerships and obtain many of the benefits granted to married couples in the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom.
Despite the dramatic recent progress in the United States, however, there remains substantial and heated
public opposition. When the California Supreme Court declared in May 2008 that the state's constitution
required recognition of same-sex marriages, the voters promptly amended the state's constitution via
referendum to ban same-sex marriage. On May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court upheld that
amendment as a legitimate exercise of the people's referendum power, but preserved the 18,000 gay
marriages that had been entered into during the interim. (Gay marriage proponents say that they hope to
repeal the prohibition by referendum in the next election.) In Maine, opponents of same-sex marriage
have vowed that they will seek to overturn the actions of their state representatives by popular
referendum. Polls regularly report that a majority of the country is committed to the view that marriage
should be limited to the union of a man and a woman, though support for same-sex marriage has
increased in recent years. Perhaps reflecting the polls, both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton opposed
gay marriage in the 2008 election (though each supported civil unions).

1.
What explains the apparent trend toward legal recognition of same-sex marriage or civil unions? And
how should we understand the sharp discrepancy between the law and the politics of same-sex marriage?
Not so long ago, there was no discrepancy. As a legal and political matter, same-sex marriage was an
oxymoron, or as some opponents have put it, a "moral impossibility." Hostility to the concept was
widespread and blatant. In 1971, when Michael Wetherbee of the Minnesota ACLU argued that a gay
couple had the right to marry under that state's constitution, one judge on the Minnesota Supreme Court
actually turned his chair around and refused to face Wetherbee as he delivered his argument. Not a single
judge asked a question. The court's unanimous decision denying the claim cited the book of Genesis to
support its conclusion that marriage is properly limited to the union of a man and a woman.
A decade later, a federal judge ruled that a same-sex couple granted a license to marry by a county clerk
in Boulder, Colorado, could not seek immigration benefits accorded to spouses. He reasoned that the
definition of marriage had its origins in canon law, and "canon law in both Judaism and Christianity could
not possibly sanction any marriage between persons of the same sex because of the vehement
condemnation in the scriptures of both religions of all homosexual relationships." When a circuit court in
Hawaii declared a state ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional in 1996, the voters of Hawaii
responded by amending their constitution to overturn the ruling. The same year, the United States
Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, designed to ensure that same-sex marriages recognized by
individual states would not be entitled to any federal marriage benefits, and could be disregarded by
other states.
In 1999, however, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the state's refusal to grant the benefits
associated with marriage to same-sex couples violated the clause of its state constitution that prohibits
discrimination in the allocation of state benefits. The court left the precise form of remedy to the
Vermont legislature, which responded with a compromise of sorts—it reserved marriage for opposite-sex
couples, but created a new category, "civil union," that gave same-sex couples the same rights and
benefits that married couples enjoyed.
Gay rights advocates have recorded an impressive string of court victories since then in New Jersey,
Massa-chusetts, California, Connecticut, and Iowa. These decisions break important new ground, but
what is most striking about them is how weak the arguments against gay marriage are; so much so that it
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is difficult to see how courts could ever have ruled otherwise. Three arguments predominate: (1) the state
is responsible for preserving the traditional conception of marriage; (2) limiting marriage to heterosexual
couples furthers the state's interests in promoting procreation and/or healthy childrearing; and (3) the
state has a legitimate interest in refusing to condone homosexual behavior that it deems immoral.
he first argument, based on preserving tradition, is circular: it seeks to justify the limitation of
marriage to unions between a man and a woman on the ground that marriage always has been
limited to unions between a man and a woman. As Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals
has written, "The justification of 'tradition' does not explain the classi- fication; it merely repeats it." In its
gay marriage decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court explained that courts must look behind tradition
to "determine whether the reasons underlying the tradition are sufficient." Tradition itself is not a
justification for discrimination. After all, women were traditionally excluded from jury service and many
professions, and blacks were traditionally denied the vote and relegated to segregation.
The fact that the tradition of marriage has been shaped by religious doctrine does not strengthen the
objection. In fact, religious views on this question, like on so many others, are deeply divided. Some
religions hold that marriage must be limited to the union of a man and a woman. But other religions, such
as Buddhism, Unitarianism, and Reform Judaism, hold just as deeply that individuals should be free to
marry those of their own sex. Under our Constitution, the state has no legitimate interest in endorsing one
religious view over the other.[5]
A variant of the tradition argument maintains that the state has a legitimate interest in preserving the
institution of marriage. But how exactly would extending the right to marry to same-sex couples
undermine marriage? It would certainly change the institution, in the sense of including couples that were
traditionally excluded. But the institution of marriage has already changed dramatically over the years.
As Andrew Sullivan has argued:
If marriage were the same today as it has been for 2,000 years, it would be possible to marry
a twelve-year-old you had never met, to own a wife as property and dispose of her at will, or
to imprison a person who married someone of a different race. And it would be impossible to
get a divorce.[6]
Certainly there is reason to be concerned about the state of marriage today. Marriage rates are down, and
the numbers of single-parent households and out-of-wedlock births are up. But as Yale law professor
William Eskridge and Darren Spedale argue in Gay Marriage: For Better or for Worse?, this is more
likely attributable to changes demanded by heterosexual couples than to any threat posed by same-sex
marriages. The diminishing importance of marriage may well be connected to the fact that it is both legal
and socially acceptable to live together outside of marriage, to have sex and bear and raise children
outside of marriage, and to end a marriage through no-fault divorce.
But there is no reason to believe that granting marriage to same-sex couples who commit themselves to
long-term relationships has in any way caused, or will do anything to accelerate, these trends. As
Eskridge and Spedale remark, opposing same-sex marriage on this ground "would be like France's
maintaining a Maginot Line against Luxembourg while the Nazis sip champagne in Paris."
Indeed, if one were truly committed to preserving the institution of marriage, it would make more sense
to include same-sex couples who seek to become part of the institution. Opposing same-sex marriage is
likely to lead to the proliferation of alternatives, such as civil unions and domestic partnerships, and those
"marriage-lite" alternatives might then prove attractive to heterosexual couples, further reducing the
centrality of marriage.

2.
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When states are pressed to articulate the reasons underlying their interest in preserving "traditional"
marriage, they most often claim that they seek to promote procreation and/or the welfare of children.
Unlike preserving a discriminatory tradition for its own sake, these are unquestionably legitimate
interests. The problem is that they seem wholly unrelated to a law that allows virtually any opposite-sex
couple and no same-sex couple to marry.
As to procreation, no state limits marriage to couples who intend to have children, or denies marriage to
couples who are infertile. Moreover, same-sex couples can and increasingly do have and raise children,
through such means as in vitro fertilization, sperm donors, surrogate mothers, and adoption. Census data
suggest that nearly 40 percent of same-sex couples were raising children in 2000. There is no reliable
evidence that children of same-sex couples are worse off than children of opposite-sex couples. Indeed,
many states that bar same-sex marriage permit same-sex couples to adopt and to take in foster children.
Thus, denying the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples is not likely to advance procreation or
children's well-being in any rational way.
The third principal justification advanced for denying marriage to same-sex couples asserts that
homosexual sex is immoral, and that the state has a legitimate interest in withholding its imprimatur from
conduct that society deems immoral. Some courts and gay rights advocates respond by reasoning that,
like "tradition," "moral disapproval" standing alone is simply an insufficient justification for
discrimination. In support of this proposition, they cite Lawrence v. Texas, the 2003 Supreme Court
decision that declared unconstitutional a criminal law prohibiting homosexual sodomy.[7] The Court in
Lawrence reasoned that at least with respect to consensual sexual relations among adults, "the fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice." As Professor Evan Gerstmann of Loyola–
Marymount College notes in Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution, the Lawrence decision "arguably
undercuts one of the best known reasons for banning same-sex marriage: moral disapproval of gay and
lesbian relationships."
But Gerstmann uses the word "arguably" advisedly. The court in Lawrence took pains to note that
whether the state could preserve marriage for opposite-sex couples was a different question. As
Georgetown law professor Robin West acknowledges in Marriage, Sexuality, and Gender, "there is a
difference between criminal bans on gay conduct, on the one hand, and the state facilitation of gay
marriage, on the other." The state regularly makes choices about what to promote or endorse based on
judgments about morality. Indeed, much of public education would be impossible if state officials could
not make choices based on morality about what should, and should not, be taught. And while the
Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right that bars criminal prohibition of abortion, the Court
has permitted the state to favor childbirth over abortion on moral grounds by providing health insurance
coverage only for childbirth.
Other courts and commentators have rejected the moral disapproval argument by pointing to recent legal
reforms as evidence that the state in question does not in fact officially disapprove of homosexual
conduct. Thus, the California Supreme Court cited state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and repealing criminal sodomy penalties to support its conclusion that "this state's
current policies and conduct regarding homosexuality recognize that gay individuals are entitled to the
same legal rights and the same respect and dignity afforded all other individuals."[8] The Massachusetts
and Vermont Supreme Courts cited similar developments in their respective state laws to reject claims
that denying benefits to homosexual couples furthered the states' disapproval of sexual relations between
homosexuals.

3.
While the moral disapproval argument has fared poorly in the courts, it still seems to have traction in
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American politics—and may well be one of the reasons for the disjuncture between the legal case for
same-sex marriage and political resistance to it. West argues that same-sex marriage proponents should
not rule morality out, as the courts have done, but take morality on. She convincingly articulates an
affirmative moral case that the "good" of marriage—fostering intimacy and caregiving for dependents
—applies equally to homosexual and heterosexual couples. In addition, she argues, gay sex is good for
the same reasons that heterosexual nonprocreative sex is good—it "contributes to intimacy, builds trust,
encourages openness, and shared responsibility.... It's not called 'making love' for nothing."
In politics, the moral argument is complicated by religious overtones. Judeo-Christian conceptions of
permissible and impermissible sexuality have a profound influence on public attitudes toward marriage.
A poll taken shortly after the Goodridge decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that 53
percent of respondents considered marriage principally a religious matter, and only 33 percent
considered it principally a legal matter. Among the former, there was overwhelming opposition to the
concept of gay marriage; among the latter, a majority favored recognition of same-sex marriage.
Recent court decisions have stressed repeatedly that they address only the question of "civil marriage," a
secular institution created and defined by the state, and leave untouched religions' freedom to define and
implement "religious marriage" in their own terms. But as University of Michigan law professor Douglas
Laycock argues in his essay in Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, the problem is more
deep-rooted:
Part of the reason the same-sex-marriage issue is so intractable is that it arises in the context
of our most fundamental and long lasting breach of separation of church and state.... In
marriage, legal and religious institutions are thoroughly combined.
Laycock suggests that the marriage debate might be considerably less heated if religious and civil
marriage were more clearly separated. To that end, he proposes that "civil marriage" should be
performed by state officials only, and should determine all the civic benefits, rights, and duties that
accompany marriage. "Religious marriages" would be performed by clerics, pursuant to their own rules
and regulations, and would have no effect on state laws. Over time, these separate rituals and rules would
reinforce the message that civil marriage and religious marriage are distinct institutions.
West offers a similar prescription, proposing that marriage reform advocates adopt a strategy aimed not
at extending marriage to same-sex couples, but at replacing marriage with civil unions for all. She
believes that such a legal development would help make clear the purely secular nature of the state's
interest in long-term committed relationships, and would free the issue of the religious features that make
reform so controversial. She envisions a future in which civil unions would be available to any two
committed persons, without regard to sexual orientation. Marriage would also remain available, but West
hopes that couples of all orientations would increasingly choose civil unions over marriage precisely
because the former would be more consistent with notions of fairness and justice.
In addition, as West notes, there are many reasons to be critical about the institution of marriage, which
has permitted society to shirk collective responsibility for dependent care by relegating it to the private
sphere, where women shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden. A shift to civil unions might
create an opportunity to reshape the institution to ameliorate some of marriage's negative effects; and
including same-sex couples might help to undermine the stereotyped conceptions of gender that
contribute to marriage's flaws.
est and Laycock may be correct as a theoretical matter that taking the religion out of civil
marriage would be a marked improvement. But as a practical matter, there is no political
constituency either for replacing marriage with civil unions or for separating civil and religious marriage.
As long as marriage remains the preferred option, gay rights advocates are likely to insist that relegating
same-sex couples to civil unions denies them equal respect, and with good reason. And even if one could
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identify a constituency for separating civil and religious marriage, such a campaign would very likely
provoke at least as much passionate opposition as the same-sex marriage movement has.
In Gay Marriage, Eskridge and Spedale also advocate a strategy focused on civil unions, although on
more pragmatic grounds. Citing an article by Professor Kees Waaldjik, who helped develop the strategy
behind the Netherlands' recognition of same-sex marriage,[9] Eskridge and Spedale argue that the best
way forward is incremental. On this view, states (or nations) are likely to recognize same-sex marriage
only after a step-by-step process in which they first eliminate laws criminalizing homosexual sodomy,
then amend anti-discrimination laws to cover sexual orientation, then extend some government
employment–related benefits to same-sex partners of civil servants, and then enact a domestic
partnership or civil union law. Where advocates press for same-sex marriage without that incremental
foundation, they are likely to fail, or worse, to provoke a backlash, as did the pro-same-sex-marriage
judicial decisions in Hawaii in the 1990s.
The recent state court decisions recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marry support the
incremental thesis. As noted above, the California and Vermont courts relied on the history of gay rights
legal reforms within their states to counter claims about moral disapproval of homosexuality. And in
Connecticut and California, the fact that the legislature had already extended virtually all the benefits
and rights of marriage to same-sex couples under the rubric of civil unions or domestic partnerships was
crucial to the legal victories. Because there were no tangible differences between marriages and
nonmarriage partnerships, both states found themselves defending a law that seemed to serve no purpose
other than the patently illegitimate one of relegating same-sex couples to a second-class status.
The current same-sex marriage strategy in the United States is also incremental in a geographical sense,
proceeding state by state rather than at the federal level. Gay rights advocates have made a conscious
effort to keep the issue away from the federal courts, preferring to develop their arguments on state
constitutional grounds or in state legislatures in order to shield them from review by the conservative
United States Supreme Court.
Accordingly, these groups were widely critical of the recent lawsuit challenging California's Proposition 8
on federal constitutional grounds, even though it was filed by the team of Theodore Olson and David
Boies, the lawyers who represented Bush and Gore, respectively, in the legal battle over the 2000
election. Advocates worry that the national political climate is not yet ready for the recognition of
same-sex marriage. No federal gay rights bill has ever passed Congress. Discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is not prohibited by federal law. And the most recent federal law addressing the issue,
the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, expressly limits federal marriage benefits to opposite-sex couples.
During the election campaign, President Obama promised to repeal the Defense of Marriage Act and to
end the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy, but he has not taken initiative on either matter yet.
Olson and Boies may well have considered the legal arguments against gay marriage to be so weak as to
practically invite a federal constitutional challenge. And California may be the best venue for such a suit,
precisely because, as noted above, the state affords same-sex couples all the rights and benefits of
marriage, leaving no justification for denying them the label "marriage" other than the bare desire to
relegate gays and lesbians to a second-class status—a desire the Supreme Court condemned as
illegitimate in both Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans,[10] the 1996 ruling invalidating a Colorado
anti–gay rights referendum. Still, the stakes are extremely high, and the risks of an adverse decision from
the Supreme Court are considerable. Incrementalism would have been the smarter strategy.
ach incremental victory at the state level, moreover, helps to prepare the ground for eventual
broader reform, for at least two reasons. First, opposition based on the contention that same-sex
marriage is an oxymoron is plausible only so long as there is no such thing as same-sex marriage. Now
that thousands of same-sex couples have been married, no one can claim that same-sex marriage is
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simply unthinkable. Second, just as the increased visibility of gays and lesbians over the last generation
has reduced fear and prejudice born of ignorance, so the fact that marriage has been extended to
same-sex couples in several states and nations without any deleterious consequences is likely to
undermine opposition based on fear of the unknown. While a majority of all Americans still oppose gay
marriage, 57 percent of Americans under forty support it; time is on gay marriage's side.
Eskridge, Spedale, and West also argue that the best forum for achieving lasting victory is legislatures,
not the courts. That seems less clear. There is no question that those seeking change cannot restrict their
advocacy to the courts; a multitiered strategy is critical. But the recent court decisions suggest that it
would be wrong to write off the judiciary. In view of the polls showing continued popular resistance to
gay marriage, progress in the political realm is likely to be difficult. At the same time, the patent
weakness of the legal arguments against recognizing same-sex marriage suggest that courts may be a
more receptive forum. Polls show much less resistance to civil unions, and in some instances, majority
support for that alternative. Thus, a state-by-state strategy that pursues civil unions politically, and
same-sex marriage through the courts, may be most likely to succeed.
Moreover, as Gerstmann argues, judicial decisions can serve as a catalyst for political change. The first
year after the Massachusetts Supreme Court approved same-sex marriage, a constitutional convention in
Massachusetts voted 105–92 in favor of an amendment barring same-sex marriage. Massachusetts law
requires such a vote two years in a row, however, and the next year, the amendment was voted down,
157–39. In 2007, the amendment again was defeated, 151–45. Today, 56 percent of Massachusetts
voters approve of same-sex marriage. The supreme court decision took some time to sink in, but seems to
have played a positive role in changing the political landscape.
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the history of constitutional law "is the story of the
extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded."[11] Just as the
institution of marriage survived its extension to couples of different races in the 1960s, so it will survive
its extension to couples of the same sex in the twenty-first century. If the inclusion of same-sex couples
changes the institution, it is likely to be for the better, rendering it more consistent with ideals of fairness.
For marriage itself, then, and more important for the constitutional principle of equality, the only just
result is to accord equal dignity and respect to all those who choose to enter long-term, committed family
relationships, irrespective of their sexual orientation.
—June 4, 2009
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